
Private Parking
Industry Steps Up with Nuclear-storage Solution
Scattered across the United States at 72 power
plant sites, radioactive, spent fuel left over from more than
four decades of commercial nuclear-fueled electric generation
sits in storage, waiting for a promised federal facility to
open.
It’s been a long wait and it might not
be even halfway over. A federal law signed by President Ronald
Reagan in 1983 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop
a permanent repository and begin accepting spent fuel by February
1998. But the site at Nevada’s Yucca Mountain remains
under development and entangled in political opposition, and
last month the DOE announced it won’t open before 2020.
That’s 22 years behind schedule, pushed back from last
year’s estimate of 2015, pushed back from the prior year’s
estimate of 2012, pushed back from the previous estimate of
2010.
That the passage of time seems to move the
opening of Yucca Mountain not nearer but farther away might
seem ironically fitting for an industry owing so much to Einsteinean
theory. But the prospect of a permanent national repository
receding into the future also implies that the source of about
one-fifth of the nation’s electricity could do some receding
of its own. A power plant that runs out of on-site storage space
for spent fuel will have to stop producing it; in other words,
shut down.
Running the Meter
By the early 1990s it was evident the federal
government would miss its own deadline to provide a spent-fuel
repository. Some large utilities with active nuclear programs
saw that running their plants even for the term of their existing
licenses might depend on temporarily parking spent fuel somewhere
other than the generation sites where it was accumulating, while
they waited for the government to get its act together.
Dairyland Power Cooperative was among those
taking the lead. It hadn’t had an active nuclear operation
since 1987 when it shut down its small plant at Genoa on the
Mississippi River. But Dairyland did have 42 tons of spent fuel.
It wasn’t supposed to be that way. Wisconsin’s
first commercial nuclear plant, the La Crosse Boiling Water
Reactor (LACBWR) was a demonstration project for the old Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC). Capable of generating 50 megawatts
of power, it began full-scale operations in 1971. When the AEC
ended the project and sold the plant to Dairyland in 1973, it
came with assurances that even if the cooperative decided to
cease LACBWR operations, it would realize several million dollars
on the sale of the fuel for reprocessing.
But four years later, citing concerns about
illicit diversion of fuel for weapons use—something requiring
uranium far more highly enriched than any used in a power plant—the
federal government abandoned its reprocessing program. Now the
fuel at Genoa and every other U.S. nuclear plant, once its potential
to generate electricity was exhausted, would be useless but
still highly radioactive, with no place to go.
By 1987 Dairyland concluded it was economically
unfeasible to run the comparatively small unit. Since the shutdown
it’s been maintained in a safe-storage condition but can’t
be fully decommissioned until the fuel is removed. This presents
a continuing problem for Dairyland and its distribution co-op
owners, because maintaining safe storage and providing security
for LACBWR’s spent fuel now costs about $6 million a year.
Facing similar problems and with the added
twist that they hadn’t stopped creating spent fuel, by
1994 other utilities were looking for non-federal solutions.
Various entities, Indian tribes, individual counties, and even
private landowners brought proposals. Dairyland and seven active
nuclear utilities formed a consortium called Private Fuel Storage
(PFS) and started examining potential sites for a temporary
repository.
Won’t You Be My Neighbor?
One obstacle to developing Yucca Mountain is
that it’s a site chosen by the federal government, not
by its neighbors. They are few and far between, but fast-growing
Las Vegas lies about 90 miles away and the U.S. Senate minority
leader hails from Nevada.
The PFS site has a few challenges along similar
lines, but they’re mitigated by the fact that the neighbors
came to PFS, not the other way around.
John Parkyn, CEO of Private Fuel Storage and
Dairyland’s manager for nuclear and special projects,
stresses the importance of willing partners furnishing the site.
“In fact, we didn’t even look at any sites that
weren’t voluntarily offered,” he told Wisconsin
Energy Cooperative News, noting that more than 30 were considered.
In 1996, the tiny Skull Valley Band of Goshute
Indians approached PFS and offered the use of some of its land
in Utah, about 60 miles southwest of Salt Lake City.
The Goshutes numbered fewer than 200 and the
Utah reservation land had always belonged to the tribe. Tribal
government visited nuclear facilities in the U.S. and abroad
and decided it wanted the economic opportunities associated
with a temporary storage facility. PFS agreed to lease 820 acres
and provide other considerations for the Goshutes. Details are
closely held by PFS and the tribe, but it’s said the Goshutes
will benefit from improved health-care access, education and
training, housing, employment, and more.
Federal regulatory review began in 1997, and
after almost nine years of ups and downs including one recommended
denial and a subsequent reconsideration, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) on February 21, 2006, granted a license to
develop and operate the facility.
Not Over ‘til It’s Over
For years, Utah state officials litigated
against any authorization of PFS by state or federal regulators.
As they lost round after round in the courts, others grew more
active.
Last November, attempting to peel away individual
utility members of the consortium, Senator Orrin Hatch (R–UT)
met with top executives of Xcel Energy, the partner with the
largest ownership share. Hatch said he told Xcel President Paul
Bonavia and CEO Dick Kelly he would “pull out every stop
in the book to stop the PFS plan.” Since then, Hatch has
claimed to have persuaded several PFS partners to end or suspend
financial support.
By mid-April, Hatch’s Senate web site
claimed six of the eight partners “have now publicly distanced
themselves from the PFS plan and the organization faces no hope
of new investment partners.”
PFS spokeswoman Sue Martin questions the impact
of Hatch’s maneuvers. Concerning Xcel’s role, she
told us last fall that “there was never any guarantee
that they would participate initially as a customer of the facility,
and there are customers far beyond our member utilities.”
In mid-April Parkyn told us, “The big
issue is to get people to commit to using it and none of that
could happen until the license was granted.” Parkyn remains
confident that with no similar alternative on the horizon for
at least 14 years, utilities will commit.
“PFS has a solution that’s immediately
available to resolve this situation safely and securely,”
he says, adding that actual construction will take about 36
months. As to safety and security, Parkyn says, “There
are those who tell us it isn’t safe to transport nuclear
fuel across the country and put it all in one place in Utah.
They may believe that, but I don’t see why they would
also believe it’s safer where it is now.”
Indeed, Parkyn would argue it’s neither
safer nor cheaper for consumers to leave things as is. A multi-million
dollar settlement with a local tribe and $16 million annually
for renewable energy development are among conditions imposed
on Xcel by a Minnesota law permitting the storage needed to
avoid the shutdown next year of two plants licensed to run until
2014. With officials contemplating a yearly $2 million fee to
keep spent fuel at the old Vermont Yankee plant, Parkyn says,
“That’s a tremendous tax on electricity.”
A Columbo Moment
Something in the federal government’s
stance on PFS keeps pulling an observer back, a nagging inconsistency
begging to be resolved. Votes by Hatch and Senate colleague
Robert Bennett (R–UT) in 2002 to continue development
of Yucca Mountain were reportedly secured with a Bush administration
pledge to block PFS. But while the administration claims adamant
opposition, the NRC votes to license PFS and the administration-supported
2005 energy bill promotes new nuclear generation technology.
An April meeting between Hatch and DOE Secretary Samuel Bodman
yields a press release denying the government might consider
PFS as a Yucca Mountain alternative.
Might administration officials like PFS to
go forward as long as they needn’t admit it? Parkyn’s
answer is both perceptive and diplomatic. “If they got
some encouragement, it would move them quite a bit,” he
says. “Right now they’re only hearing from two Senators
from Utah who are saying, ‘not here.’”
A telling moment will come when the federal
Bureau of Land Management rules on a right-of-way permit for
PFS to use public land for either a railroad spur or transfer
station to move waste canisters from a main rail line to the
facility. A period of public comment on the application ends
early this month.
Parkyn suggests failure to deal with nuclear
waste costs utilities needed flexibility in meeting demand for
more large-capacity, 24–7, base-load generation. “The
industry is building coal plants like mad, because you can’t
do anything else,” he says.
He mentions John Rowe, former nuclear submarine
officer and CEO of Chicago-based Exelon Corp., operating 20
nuclear units. National energy policy calls for more of them,
several utilities are planning new ones, even some environmental
groups say they’re an answer to greenhouse emissions.
But Rowe recently said none will be built until the waste problem
is solved.
“That ought to be a wake-up call,”
Parkyn says.—Dave Hoopman